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In 2015, more than 27 million people in the United States repor-
ted that they currently used illicit drugs or misused prescription
drugs, and more than 66 million reported binge drinking during
the previous month. Data from public health surveillance systems
on drug and alcohol abuse are crucial for developing and evaluat-
ing interventions to prevent and control such behavior. However,
public  health  surveillance  for  behavioral  health  in  the  United
States  has  been  hindered  by  organizational  issues  and  other
factors. For example, existing guidelines for surveillance evalu-
ation do not distinguish between data systems that characterize be-
havioral health problems and those that assess other public health
problems (eg, infectious diseases). To address this gap in behavi-
oral health surveillance, we present a revised framework for evalu-
ating behavioral health surveillance systems. This system frame-
work builds on published frameworks and incorporates additional
attributes (informatics capabilities and population coverage) that
we deemed necessary for evaluating behavioral health–related sur-
veillance. This revised surveillance evaluation framework can sup-
port ongoing improvements to behavioral health surveillance sys-
tems and ensure their continued usefulness for detecting, prevent-
ing, and managing behavioral health problems.
Introduction
In 2015, more than 27 million people in the United States repor-
ted that they currently used illicit drugs or misused prescription
drugs, and more than 66 million reported binge drinking during
the previous month (1). The annual cost to the US economy for
drug use and misuse is estimated at $193 billion, and the annual
cost  for excessive alcohol use is  estimated at  $249 billion (1).
Death rates from suicide, drug abuse, and chronic liver disease
have increased steadily for 15 years while death rates from other
causes have declined (2). Such behavioral health problems are
amenable to prevention and intervention (3). Because behavioral
health care (eg, substance abuse and mental health services) has
traditionally been delivered separately from physical health care
rather than together, the Surgeon General’s report calls for integ-
rating the 2 types of health care (1).
Public health surveillance and monitoring is critical to compre-
hensive health care (4–6). However, surveillance for behavioral
health has been hindered by organizational barriers, limitations of
existing data sources, and issues related to stigma and confidenti-
ality (7). To address this gap, the Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists (CSTE) has led the development of indicators for
behavioral health surveillance (Box) (8) and has piloted their ap-
plication in several states. CSTE’s rationale for selection of indic-
ators was based on evidence for the need for such indicators and
the feasibility of using them (8), suggesting that a national surveil-
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Box. Indicators Recommended by the Council of State and Territorial
Epidemiologists Working Group on Surveillance Indicators for Substance
Abuse and Mental Health
Alcohol
1.Adult binge drinking prevalence 
2.Youth binge drinking prevalence 
3.Alcohol-related crash death rate 
4.Liver disease and cirrhosis death rate 
5.State excise taxes on alcohol (beer, wine, distilled spirits) 
Other Drugs
6.Drug overdose mortality rate 
7.Hospitalization rate associated with drugs with potential
for abuse and dependence
 
8.Prescription opioid sales per capita 
9.Illicit drug or alcohol dependence or abuse in the past year 




11.Suicide death rate 
12.Hospital discharge rate for mental disorders 
13.Emergency department visit rate for intentional self-
harm
 
14.Prevalence of youth suicide attempts 
15.Prevalence of past-year major depressive episodes 
16.Prevalence of past-year any mental illness 
17.Prevalence of past-year serious mental illness 
18.Prevalence of frequent mental distress 
Adapted from: Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (8).
Routine evaluation of public health surveillance is necessary to en-
sure that any surveillance system provides timely, useful data and
that it justifies the resources required to conduct surveillance. Ex-
isting surveillance evaluation guidelines (9,10) reflect a long his-
tory of surveillance for infectious diseases (eg, influenza, tubercu-
losis,  sexually transmitted infections).  Such guidelines present
challenges for behavioral health surveillance. To address these
challenges, CSTE convened a behavioral health surveillance work-
ing group of public health scientists and federal and state surveil-
lance epidemiologists with experience in behavioral health surveil-
lance and epidemiology. These experts came from the Substance
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA),
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), local and
state health departments,  and other  partner  organizations.  The
working group was charged with revising the published guidelines
for evaluating public health surveillance systems (9,10) and ex-
tending them to the evaluation of behavioral health surveillance
systems.
To lay a foundation for revising recommendations for evaluating
behavioral health surveillance, the working group articulated con-
cepts, characteristics, and events that occur more commonly with
behavioral health surveillance than with infectious disease surveil-
lance. First, behavioral health surveillance attributes are related to
data source or indicator type, and evaluation should be made in the
context of the data collection’s original purpose. For example, us-
ing mortality data for drug overdose deaths means that timeliness
assessment is determined by availability of death certificate data,
which are often delayed because of the time needed for toxico-
logy testing. Second, traditional public health concepts may need
adjustment for behavioral health. The concept of outcomes of in-
terest (case definition) in behavioral health surveillance must be
broadened to include health-related problems, events, conditions,
behaviors, thoughts (eg, suicide ideation), and policy changes (eg,
alcohol pricing). Third, clinical course of disease becomes a con-
ceptual  model  for  behavioral  health.  For  example,  behavioral
health conditions may appear between precedent symptoms, beha-
viors, conditions, or exposure duration (from unhealthy stress or
subclinical conditions), before the final appearance or diagnosis of
disease or condition (eg, serious mental illness or substance use
disorders). Fourth, behavioral health surveillance attributes are in-
terrelated.  For example,  literature regarding data quality com-
monly includes aspects of completeness, validity, accuracy, con-
sistency, availability, and timeliness (11). Finally, a gold standard
for assessing some attributes might not be readily available (eg, a
standard for suicide ideation). In lieu of a gold standard, 4 broad
alternative methods can be used: regression approaches (12,13),
simulation (14),  capture–recapture methods (15),  and network
scale-up methods (16). The working group made modifications or
revisions to the existing attributes of public health surveillance
system evaluation and added 2 attributes (population coverage and
informatics capabilities).
The purpose of this article is to summarize key definitions of at-
tributes and methods for evaluating behavioral health surveillance
systems developed by the working group. In addition, we present a
logic model that portrays behavioral surveillance system theory
and plausible associations between inputs and expected short-
term, midterm, and long-term outcomes (Figure).
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Figure. Logic model for behavioral health surveillance, adapted and used with
permission from World Health Organization, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, and International Clearinghouse for Birth Defects Surveillance and
Research. Source: Birth defects surveillance: a manual for program managers.
Geneva (CH): World Health Organization; 2014. http://apps.who.int/iris/bit-
stream/10665/110223/1/9789241548724_eng.pdf.
 
Attributes for Evaluation of Behavioral
Surveillance Systems
The working group provided definitions, recommended assess-
ment methods, and reported on discussion of 12 behavioral sur-
veillance system evaluation attributes the group recommended.
Ten  attributes  are  presented  in  order  of  existing  evaluation
guidelines (Table) (9) followed by the 2 new attributes.
Usefulness
Definition. A public health surveillance system is useful if it con-
tributes  to  preventing,  treating,  and  controlling  diseases,  risk
factors, and behaviors or if it  contributes to implementation or
evaluation of public health policies. Usefulness can include assess-
ing the public health impact of a disease, risk, or behavior and as-
sessing the status of effective prevention strategies and policies.
Assessment methods.  Depending on its objectives, the surveil-
lance system can be considered useful if it satisfactorily addresses
one or more of the following questions:
Does the system detect behavioral health outcomes, risk factors,
or policies of public health importance, and does it support pre-
vention, treatment, and control of these conditions?
•
Does the system provide estimates of the magnitude of morbid-
ity and mortality of the behavioral health conditions under sur-
veillance?
•
Does the system detect trends that signal changes in the occur-
rence of behavioral health conditions or clustering of cases in
time or space?
•
Does the system support evaluation of prevention, treatment,
and control programs?
•
Does the system “lead to improved clinical, behavioral, social,
policy, or environmental practices” (9) for behavioral health
problems?
•
Does the system stimulate research to improve prevention, treat-
ment, or control of behavioral health events under surveillance?
•
In addition to these attributes, a survey of people or stakeholders
who use data from the system would be helpful in gathering evid-
ence regarding the system’s usefulness.
Discussion. CSTE’s set of behavioral health indicators draws on 8
data sources: mortality data (death certificates), hospital discharge
and emergency department data, the Behavioral Risk Factor Sur-
veillance  System (https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/index.html),  the
Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System (https://www.cdc.gov/
healthyyouth/data/yrbs/index.htm),  prescription  drug  sales
(opioids), state excise taxes for alcohol, the Fatality Analysis Re-
porting System (https://www.nhtsa.gov/research-data/fatality-ana-
lysis-reporting-system-fars), and the National Survey on Drug Use
and Health (https://www.samhsa.gov/data/population-data-nsduh).
These sources represent information regarding people, policies,
and market data (eg, drug sales) and support different types of de-
cisions for decision makers. Usefulness should be assessed in the
context of the decision maker or interested stakeholders. In addi-
tion, surveillance data should provide clues to emerging problems
and changing behaviors and products (eg, new drugs).
Simplicity
Definition. A public health surveillance system is simple in struc-
ture and function if it has a small number of components with op-
erations that are easily understood and maintained.
Assessment methods. Simplicity is evaluated by considering the
system’s data-collection methods and the level to which it is integ-
rated into other systems (9). For example, a surveillance system
might rely on multiple information sources for case finding and
data abstraction and for follow-up with confirmation by an inde-
pendent data source or by an expert review panel. Evaluating sim-
plicity would involve examining each data source individually and
how the system works as a whole or how easily it integrates with
other systems.
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Discussion.  As with infectious disease surveillance, behavioral
health surveillance systems should be as simple as possible while
still meeting the system’s objective and purpose. Each behavioral
health indicator or outcome should have a clear definition and be
measurable in that surveillance system. Surveillance systems us-
ing  population  survey  methods  should  have  simple  standard
sampling  methods  (eg,  paper-based,  computer-based,  or  tele-
phone-based),  data  processing  (eg,  data  cleaning,  screening,
weighting, and editing or imputing), and data dissemination (eg,
reports, internet pages). Analysis of trends in behavioral health
data assumes no change in variable definition(s) over time and that
data elements are consistently defined when the numerator and de-
nominator are taken from different data sources. This can entail
defining or stabilizing a standard behavioral health case definition
(eg, binge drinking differences between men and women) or dia-
gnostic coding methods (eg, International Statistical Classification
of Diseases and Related Health Problems, 10th Revision [17]).
Simplicity is closely related to acceptance and timeliness (9) for
detecting an event or outbreak.
Flexibility
Definition. A system is flexible if its design and operation can be
adjusted easily in response to a demand for new information. For
example,  the  Behavioral  Risk  Factor  Surveillance  System
(BRFSS) (https://www.cdc.gov/brfss/) allows flexibility for states
to add questions (optional modules), adapting to new demands or
to local health-related events or concerns, but it retains a core set
of questions that allows state-to-state comparisons. The optional
modules can address important state and nationwide emergent and
local health concerns. The addition of new survey modules also al-
lows the programs to monitor new or changing behaviors in the
states. Moreover, states can stratify their BRFSS samples to estim-
ate prevalence data for regions or counties within their respective
states.
Assessment methods. Flexibility can be assessed retrospectively
on the basis of historical evidence of response to change. A pro-
cess map of steps needed to implement a change in the system as
well as the following measures can address evaluation of flexibil-
ity:
System technical design and change-process approval•
Time required to implement a change•
Number of stakeholders or organizations involved in agreement
to implement a change (decision-making authority and system
ownership, both important factors)
•
Resources needed for change, including funding, technical ex-
pertise, time, and infrastructure
•
Need for legacy (ie, continuity or legislative mandates) versus
flexibility
•
Time and process for validating and testing questions (eg, popu-
lation-based surveys)
•
Ability to add questions for specific stakeholders (eg, states,
partner organizations) versus comparability for national estim-
ates
•
Ability to access subtopics•
Methods of data collection (eg, move from landlines to cellular
telephones)
•
Ability to deal with emerging challenges (eg, new or evolving
recreational drugs)
•
Discussion. The Behavioral Health Surveillance Working Group
recognizes different levels of flexibility. For example, BRFSS is
flexible in terms of state-added questions, but adding a question to
the core set is process-intensive. Flexibility should be assessed in
the context of the data-collection purpose and the organization
from which the data originate. For behavioral surveillance, flexib-
ility to respond to changing norms and product availability is im-
portant.
Data quality
Definition. System data quality is defined in terms of complete-
ness and validity of data. Complete data have no missing values;
valid data have no error (bias) caused by invalid codes or system-
atic deviation.
Assessment methods.  For behavioral surveillance, measures of
statistical stability (relative standard error) and precision (random
variability and bias) are important. Completeness can be assessed
at the item level (are values of a variable missing at random or
clustering according to some characteristic?). Evaluation of com-
pleteness  of  the  overall  surveillance  system can  vary  by  data
source. Completeness of a survey can be assessed by examining
the  sample  frame  (does  it  exclude  groups  of  respondents?),
sampling methodology, survey mode, imputation, weighting, and
ranking methods (18). For behavioral surveillance based on med-
ical records, consideration should be given to the completeness of
all fields, standardization across reporting units (eg, medical re-
cords systems), coding process, and specific nomenclature (eg, for
drugs and treatment). For surveillance based on death certificates,
variability in death scene investigation procedures, presence of a
medical examiner versus a coroner,  reporting standards across
geographic boundaries, and the process of death certification will
be relevant.
Assessment of validity (ie, measurement of what is intended to be
measured) also varies by data source. For use of data from a sur-
vey, consider cognitive testing of questions, focus groups, compar-
ison with information from a health care provider, and identifica-
tion of external factors that might influence reporting in a system-
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atic way (19). An example of systematic influence is discrimina-
tion or prejudice in any form of arbitrary distinction, exclusion, or
restriction affecting a person, usually (but not only) because of an
inherent personal characteristic or perceived membership of a par-
ticular group (20).
Evaluation of statistical stability (precision) involves calculation
of relative standard error of the primary estimate. Assessment of
bias (systematic error) should address the following:
Selection bias: systematic differences between sample and tar-
get populations
•
Performance bias: systematic differences between groups in
care provided or in exposure to factors other than the interven-
tions of interest
•
Detection bias: systematic differences in how the outcome is de-
termined (eg, death scene investigation protocols)
•
Attrition bias: systematic loss to follow up•
Reporting bias: systematic differences in how people report
symptoms or ideation
•
Other: biases related to a particular data source•
Discussion. Many data-quality definitions depend on other system
performance attributes (eg, timeliness, usefulness, acceptability)
(21). Because of reliance on multiple data sources, data quality
must be assessed in different ways. For surveillance relying on
surveys, concepts of reliability, validity, and comparison with al-
ternative data sources are important. For example, considerations
of possible data-quality concerns arise with use of mortality data,
particularly underreporting of suicide.
Acceptability
Definition.  Acceptability is  the willingness of  individuals  and
groups (eg, survey respondents, patients, health care providers, or-
ganizations) to participate in a public health surveillance system
(9).
Assessment methods. For behavioral surveillance, acceptability in-
cludes the willingness of people outside the sponsoring agency to
report accurate, consistent, complete, and timely data. Factors in-
fluencing the acceptability of a particular system include
Perceived public health importance of a health condition or be-
havior, risk factor, thought, or policy
•
Nature of societal norms regarding the risk behavior or out-
come (discrimination or stigma)
•
Collective perception of privacy protection and government
trustworthiness
•
Dissemination of public health data to reporting sources and in-
terested parties
•
Responsiveness of the sponsoring agency to recommendations
or comments
•
Costs to the person or agency reporting data, including simpli-
city, time required to enter data into the system, and whether the
system is passive or active
•
Federal and state statutes ensuring privacy and confidentiality
of data reported
•
Community participation in the system•
When a new system imposes additional reporting requirements
and increased burden on public health professionals, acceptability
can be indicated by topic-specific or agency-specific participation
rate, interview completion and question refusal rates, complete-
ness of reporting, reporting rate, and reporting timeliness.
Discussion. Assessment of acceptability includes considerations of
other attributes, including simplicity and timeliness. Acceptability
is directly related to the extent to which the surveillance system
successfully addresses stigma associated with certain conditions,
which is  particularly important  for  behavioral  surveillance,  in
terms of both the extent to which the questions included in the sur-
vey questionnaire are sensitive to the reluctance people may have
to report various behavioral health problems and the nonjudgment-
al quality of questions.
Sensitivity
Definition. Sensitivity is the percentage of true behavioral health
events, conditions, or behaviors occurring among the population
detected by the surveillance system. A highly sensitive system
might detect small changes in the number, incidence, or preval-
ence of events occurring in the population as well as historical
trends in the occurrence of behavioral health events, conditions, or
behaviors.  Sensitivity  may also refer  to  the  ability  to  monitor
changes in prevalence over time, including the ability to detect
clusters in time, place, and segments of the population requiring
investigation and intervention.
Assessment methods. Measurement of the sensitivity of a public
health surveillance system is affected by the likelihood that
Health-related events, risk factors, or effects of public health
policies are occurring in the population under surveillance
•
Cases are coming to the attention of institutions (eg, health care,
educational, community-based, harm-reduction, law enforce-
ment, or survey-collection institutions) that report to a central-
ized system
•
Cases will be identified, reflecting the abilities of health care
providers; capacity of health care systems; type, quality, or
availability of the screening tool; or survey implementation
•
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Events will be reported to the system. For example, in assess-
ing sensitivity of a surveillance system based on a telephone-
based survey, one can assess the 1) likelihood that people have
telephones to take the call and agree to participate; 2) ability of
respondents to understand the questions and correctly identify
their status and risk factors, and 3) willingness of respondents to
report their status.
•
Because many important conditions for behavioral health surveil-
lance  are  self-reported,  validating  or  adjusting  the  self-report
might be required using statistical methods (10), field-based stud-
ies (16), or methods in the absence of a gold standard (12–15).
Other factors related to behavioral health (eg, discrimination and
variability in implementing parity in payment coverage between
physical health and behavioral health care) can influence sensitiv-
ity, requiring alternative or parallel data sources. For example,
when using surveys as a source for prevalence data, consider ques-
tion redundancy or adding questions that might further identify
people with a condition or leading indicator.
Discussion. An evaluation of the sensitivity of a behavioral health
surveillance system should include a clear assessment of potential
biases that range from case identification to case reporting. Case
identification and case reporting will require workforce capacity,
ability, and willingness to accurately and consistently identify and
report plus an organized system for collecting, collating, and ag-
gregating identified cases.
Predictive value positive
Definition. Predictive value positive (PVP) is the proportion of re-
ported cases that actually have the health-related event, condition,
behavior, thought, or policy under surveillance.
Assessment methods. PVP’s effect on the use of public health re-
sources has 2 levels: outbreak identification and case detection.
First, PVP for outbreak detection is related to resources; if every
reported case  of  suicide ideation is  investigated and the com-
munity involved is given a thorough intervention, PVP can be
high, but at a prohibitive expense. A surveillance system with low
PVP (frequent false-positive case reports) might lead to misdirec-
ted resources. Thus, the proportion of epidemics identified by the
surveillance system that are true epidemics can be used to assess
PVP. Review of personnel activity reports,  travel records, and
telephone logbooks may be useful. Second, PVP might be calcu-
lated by analyzing the number of case investigations completed
and the proportion of reported persons who actually had the beha-
vioral health-related event. However, use of data external to the
system (eg,  medical  records,  registries,  and death certificates)
might be necessary for confirming cases as well as calculating
more than one measurement of the attribute (eg, for the system’s
data fields, for each data source or combination of data sources,
for specific health-related events).
Discussion. Although the definition of PVP is the same as for in-
fectious conditions, measuring PVP for behavioral health surveil-
lance is hindered by a lack of easily measurable true positives as a
result of stigma, communication, or cultural factors. Approaches
cited  previously  for  evaluating  accuracy in  absence  of  a  gold
standard can be helpful (12–16) in addition to the use of alternat-
ive data sources (eg, medical records, police reports, psychologic-
al autopsies), redundant questions within a survey (for survey-
based surveillance), longitudinal studies, or follow-up studies.
Representativeness
Definition. A behavioral health surveillance system is representat-
ive if characteristics of the individuals (or people) assessed by the
system as essentially the same as the characteristics of the popula-
tion subject to surveillance.
Assessment methods. Assessment of representativeness requires
definition of the target population and of the population at risk,
which can differ. Examination of groups systematically excluded
by the surveillance data source (eg, prisoners, homeless or institu-
tionalized persons, freestanding emergency departments, people
aged ≥65 in Veterans Affairs systems) can help to assess repres-
entativeness. An independent source of data regarding the out-
come of interest is also helpful. Using behavioral health event data
requires calculation of rates for a given year or for monitoring
temporal trends. These will use denominator data from external
data sources (eg, US Census Bureau ) that should be carefully as-
certained for the targeted population. These considerations facilit-
ate representation of health events in terms of time, place, and per-
son.
Discussion. Generalizing the findings of surveillance to the over-
all population should be possible with data captured from the sur-
veillance system.  Although sensitivity  is  the  proportion of  all
health events of interest captured by the system, representative-
ness quantifies whether the data system accurately reflects the dis-
tribution of the condition or affected individuals in the general
population (ie, whether systematic errors exist). For example, be-
cause many emergency departments and trauma centers that treat
acute injuries test only a limited proportion of patients for alcohol,
data regarding alcohol involvement in nonfatal injuries might not
be representative of alcohol involvement in injuries overall. Gen-
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eralization from these findings on alcohol involvement in nonfatal
injuries to all persons who have experienced these outcomes is
problematic. Alternative survey methods are useful — respondent-
driven sampling (22), network scale-up methods (16), and time/
date/location sampling (23). Evaluation of representativeness can
prompt modification of data-collection methods or redefining and
accessing the target population to accurately represent the popula-
tion of interest.
Timeliness
Definition.  Timeliness reflects the rate at which the data move
from occurrence of the health event to public health action.
Assessment methods. Evaluating timeliness of behavioral health
systems will depend on the measure used (eg, symptom, event,
condition) and the system’s purpose. Timeliness of a behavioral
health surveillance system should be associated with timing of a
consequent response for detecting a change in historical trends,
outbreaks,  or  policy to  control  or  prevent  adverse health  con-
sequences. For example, quick identification and referral is needed
for people experiencing a first episode of psychosis. However, for
a  community  detecting  an  increase  in  binge-drinking  rates,  a
longer period will be needed because the public health response
requires a systemic engagement at the community level. Specific
factors that can influence timeliness include
Delays from symptom onset to diagnosis resulting from stigma
(people might avoid diagnosis), lack of access to a facility or
practitioner for diagnosis, policy (providers might be unable to
bill for behavioral health diagnoses), credentials (relying on
medical records or insurance claims misses people without in-
surance), or a failure to diagnose to avoid labeling
•
Case definitions (eg, requiring symptoms be present for ≥6
months)
•
A symptom that might be associated with multiple possible dia-
gnoses, taking time to resolve
•
Symptoms that appear intermittently•
Variance in detection methods•
Delays in recognizing a cluster or outbreak caused by lack of
baseline data
•
Discussion. For behavioral health conditions, long periods can oc-
cur between precedent symptoms, behavior, conditions, or expos-
ure duration and the final appearance or diagnosis of a disease or
condition. Unlike immediate identification and reporting needed
for infectious diseases, some behavioral health conditions, similar
to chronic conditions, might develop more slowly; for example,
posttraumatic stress disorder (which often occurs in response to a
particular traumatic event over time) versus an episodic depres-
sion (which may occur in response to an acute event). Nonethe-
less, baseline data are vital for determining the urgency of timely
response to outbreaks or clusters of health problems related to be-
havioral health conditions. Ultimately, timeliness should be guided
by the fact that behavioral health measures are not as discrete or
easily measureable as most chronic or infectious disease measures,
and their etiology or disease progression is often not as linear.
Stability
Definition. Stability of a public health surveillance system refers
to a system’s reliability (ability to collect, manage, and provide
data dependably) and availability (ability to be operational when
needed).
Assessment methods. The system’s stability might be assessed by
protocols or model procedures based on the purpose and object-
ives of the surveillance system (9). Changes in diagnostic criteria
or in the availability of services can affect stability. When relying
on surveys, check the stability of questions and survey design. As-
sessing the system’s workforce stability and continuity should in-
clude staff training, retention, and turnover. Existing measures for
evaluating the stability of the surveillance system might be applic-
able for behavioral health surveillance systems (9).
Discussion. The stability of a behavioral health surveillance sys-
tem will depend on the operational legal or regulatory framework
on which the surveillance system is based. For example, an estab-
lished legal or regulatory framework ensures continuity in system
funding and workforce capacity. Stability should be maintained
while allowing flexibility to adapt to emerging trends. Assessing
the stability of a surveillance system should be based on the pur-
pose and objectives for which the system was designed.
Informatics capabilities
Definition. Public health informatics is the systematic application
of information and computer science and technology to public
health practice, research, and learning (24). Public health inform-
atics has 3 dimensions of benefits to behavioral health surveil-
lance: the study and description of complex systems (eg, models
of behavioral health development and intervention), the identifica-
tion of opportunities to improve efficiency and effectiveness of
surveillance systems through innovative data collection or use of
information, and the implementation and maintenance of surveil-
lance processes and systems to achieve improvements (25).
Assessment methods. When assessing informatics components of
a surveillance system, the following aspects should be considered
(25):
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Planning and system design: identifying information and
sources that best address a surveillance goal; identifying who
will access information, by what methods, and under what con-
ditions; and improving interaction with other information sys-
tems
•
Data collection: identifying potential bias associated with differ-
ent collection methods (eg, telephone use or cultural attitudes
toward technology); identifying appropriate use of structured
data, vocabulary, and data standards; and recommending tech-
nologies to support data entry
•
Data management and collation: identifying ways to share data
across computing or technology platforms, linking new data
with legacy systems, and identifying and remedying data-qual-
ity problems while ensuring privacy and security
•
Analysis: identifying appropriate statistical and visualization ap-
plications, generating algorithms to detect aberrations in behavi-
oral health events, and leveraging high-performance computa-
tional resources for large data sets or complex analyses
•
Interpretation: determining usefulness of comparing informa-
tion from a surveillance program with other data sets (related by
time, place, person, or condition)
•
Dissemination: recommending appropriate displays and best
methods for reaching the intended audience, facilitating inform-
ation finding, and identifying benefits for data providers
•
Application to public health programs: assessing the utility of
having surveillance data directly support behavioral health in-
terventions
•
Discussion. Initial guidelines for infectious disease surveillance
(4) did not include assessment of informatics capability. Although
this was included in a later publication (10), informatics was not
portrayed as an attribute for evaluation. Because of the prolifera-
tion of electronic medical records and the standards for electronic
reporting, assessment of informatics as an attribute will be crucial
for behavioral health surveillance.
Population coverage
Definition. Population coverage refers to the extent that the ob-
served population described by the data under surveillance de-
scribes the true population of interest.
Assessment methods. Population coverage can be assessed by the
proportion of respondents (survey-based) or cases (hospital- or fa-
cility-based) included in the surveillance system. Two measure-
ments resulting from population coverage assessment are 1) popu-
lation undercoverage that results from the omission of respond-
ents or cases belonging to the target population and 2) population
overcoverage that occurs because of inclusion of elements that do
not belong to the target population. In addition, a demographic
analysis (26) can provide benchmarks for assessing completeness
of  coverage  in  the  existing  surveillance  data  and  document
changes in coverage from previous periods. Furthermore, inde-
pendence and internal consistency of the demographic analysis al-
low using estimates to check survey-based coverage estimates.
Discussion. Surveillance systems (ie, survey-based or hospital- or
facility-based surveillance) can be defined by their geographic
catchment area (ie, country, region, state, county, or city) or by the
target population that the system is intended to capture. For ex-
ample, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health’s target popu-
lation is the noninstitutionalized civilian population aged 12 years
or older. Homeless people who do not use shelters, active duty
military personnel, and residents of institutional group quarters
(eg, correctional facilities, nursing homes, mental institutions, and
long-term hospitals) are excluded. Such populations not covered
by most surveillance systems can contribute to case counts in hos-
pital- or facility-based systems (eg, drug poisoning, emergency de-
partment use for self-harm, prevalence of mental illness and sub-
stance abuse problems). Evaluation of population coverage typic-
ally requires an alternative data source. For example, the estimate
from a national surveillance system can be compared with a spe-
cial study or survey in the same geographic area targeting a specif-
ic population. Projections from previous estimates might aid in
comparing existing surveillance data. Use of benchmark data sets
might aid in estimating the undercoverage prevalence of behavior-
al health indicators: the US Department of Justice’s Bureau of
Justice Statistics data (https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dca) and
the US Department of Housing of Urban Development’s (http://
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD) point-in-time estimates of home-
lessness.  Finally,  mortality data will  contain all  US residents’
deaths  occurring  in  a  given  year;  however,  residents  who die
abroad might not be included (resulting in undercoverage), and
deaths of nonresidents might be included (resulting in overcover-
age).
Conclusions and Recommendations
The increasing burden of behavioral health problems despite the
existence of effective interventions argues that surveillance for be-
havioral health problems is an essential public health function. In
establishing surveillance systems for behavioral health, guidelines
for periodic evaluation of the surveillance system are needed to
ensure continued usefulness for design, implementation, and eval-
uation of programs for preventing and managing behavioral health
conditions. We developed the framework described in this article
to facilitate the periodic assessment of these systems.
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Recommendations for improving a behavioral health surveillance
system should clearly address whether the system should continue
to be used and whether it might need to be modified to improve
usefulness. The recommendations should also consider the eco-
nomic cost of making improvements to the system and how im-
proving one attribute  of  the  system (eg,  population coverage)
might affect another attribute, perhaps negatively (eg, simplicity).
The results of a pilot implementation, in collaboration with stake-
holders, should help determine whether the surveillance system is
addressing an important public health problem and is meeting its
objective of contributing to prevention and intervention for beha-
vioral health problems.
This revised framework could be implemented in future evalu-
ations of the behavioral health surveillance systems at any level.
As behavioral health issues become more relevant and local au-
thorities enhance or develop behavioral surveillance systems, this
framework will be helpful for such evaluation. Finally, because
behavioral  health  theories,  survey  technology,  public  health
policies, clinical practices, and availability of substances continue
to evolve, this framework will need to adapt.
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Table
Table. Existing Attributes for Evaluation of Public Health Surveillance Systemsa
Attribute Definition Methods
Usefulness A public health surveillance system is useful if it contributes to
prevention and control of adverse health-related events, including
an improved understanding of the public health implications of
such events. A public health surveillance system can also be useful
if it helps to determine that an adverse health-related event
previously thought to be unimportant is actually important. In
addition, data from a surveillance system can be useful in
contributing to performance measures, including health indicators
that are used in needs assessments and accountability systems.
An assessment of the usefulness of a public health surveillance system
should begin with a review of the objectives of the system and should
consider the system's effect on policy decisions and disease-control
programs. Depending on the objectives of a particular surveillance
system, the system might be considered useful if it satisfactorily
addresses at least one of the following questions:
Does the system detect diseases, injuries, or adverse or protective
exposures of public importance in a timely way to permit accurate
diagnosis or identification, prevention or treatment, and handling of
contacts when appropriate?
•
Does the system provide estimates of the magnitude of morbidity
and mortality related to the health-related event under surveillance,
including identification of factors associated with the event?
•
Does the system detect trends that signal changes in the
occurrence of disease, injury, or adverse or protective exposure,
including detection of epidemics (or outbreaks)?
•
Does the system permit assessment of the effect of prevention and
control programs?
•
Does the system lead to improved clinical, behavioral, social, policy,
or environmental practices? Or
•
Does the system stimulate research intended to lead to prevention
or control?
•
A survey of people who use data from the system might be helpful in
gathering evidence regarding the usefulness of the system. The survey
could be done either formally with standard methodology or informally.
Simplicity Refers to the system’s structure and ease of operation. Systems
should be as simple as possible.
Measures for determining simplicity include the amount and type of
data necessary for establishing occurrence of the health-related event;
amount and type of other data about cases; number of organizations
involved in receiving case reports; integration with other systems; data
collection, management, analysis, and dissemination procedures;
amount of follow-up to update case data; staff training requirements;
and time spent on maintaining the system.
Flexibility Ability to adapt to changing information needs or technological
operating conditions with little additional time, personnel, or
allocated funds.
Probably best evaluated retrospectively by observing how a system has
responded to new demands (eg, changes in case definitions,
information technology, funding, or reporting sources).
Data quality Refers to the completeness and validity of the data recorded in the
system.
Measures for determining data quality include percentages of
unknown, invalid, and missing responses to items on data-collection
forms. In addition, data quality can be measured by applying edits for
consistency in the data; however, a full assessment might require a
special study.
Acceptability Reflects the willingness of persons and organizations to participate
in the system.
Measures for determining acceptability include subject or agency
participation rate; interview completion rates and question refusal
rates; completeness of reporting forms; physician, laboratory, or
hospital or facility reporting rate; and timeliness of data reporting. A
special study or survey might be required to obtain quantitative and
qualitative data.
Sensitivity Can be considered on at least 2 levels: at the level of case
reporting, sensitivity refers to the proportion of cases of a disease
(or event) detected by the system; on another level, it can refer to
the ability to detect outbreaks over time. In evaluation of
surveillance systems, completeness is often synonymous with
sensitivity.
Assuming that reported cases are correctly classified, the primary
emphasis in assessing sensitivity is on estimating the proportion of the
total number of cases in the population under surveillance being
detected by the system. The capacity for a system to detect outbreaks
might be enhanced if detailed diagnostic tests are used. The
measurement of sensitivity requires collection of or access to data
a Adapted from German et al (9).
(continued on next page)
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(continued)
Table. Existing Attributes for Evaluation of Public Health Surveillance Systemsa
Attribute Definition Methods
usually external to the system to determine the true frequency of the
condition and validation of data collected by the system. Also, the




The proportion of reported cases that actually are the event under
surveillance.
Sensitivity and PVP provide different perspectives on how well the
system is operating. Assessing PVP whenever sensitivity has been
assessed might be necessary. In assessing this attribute, primary
emphasis is placed on case confirmation, and records might be kept of
investigations prompted by information obtained from the system.
More than one PVP measurement might be necessary.
Representativeness A public health surveillance system that is representative provides
an unbiased indication over time and distribution of the extent of
the problem measured by the surveillance system among the
target population.
Representativeness is assessed by comparing the characteristics of
the reported events to all such actual events. Although the latter
information is generally not known, knowledge of the characteristics of
the general population, clinical course of the disease or event, and
prevailing medical practices, as well as collection of data from multiple
sources, can be used to assess this attribute. Special studies based on
samples of cases might be used. Also, the choice of an appropriate
denominator for rate calculations should be given careful
consideration.
Timeliness Reflects the speed between steps in a system. The time interval linking any of the steps in a system can be examined.
These steps can include event occurrence, event recognition by
reporting source, event reported to surveillance system, and control
and prevention activities with feedback to stakeholders. The most
relevant time interval might vary with the type of event under
surveillance.
Stability Refers to the system’s reliability (ability to collect, manage, and
provide data without failure) and availability (ability to be
operational when needed).
Measures for determining stability can include the number of
unscheduled outages and down times for computer systems, the costs
involved with any computer repair, the percentage of time the system is
operating fully, and the desired and actual amount of time required for
the system to collect, manage, and release data.
a Adapted from German et al (9).
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